






Following 14 months ofdeliberation, the
Task Groupon Deregulation ofFinancial
Services headed by Vice President George
Bush recently made its recommendations
for changes in the federal bank supervisory
and regulatory structure. Over the years a
number ofproposals for revamping this
structure have been advanced, including
several which found accommodation in
formal legislativeproposals. They invariably
generated considerable controversy and,
with one exception, failed ofadoption.
Nevertheless, in the viewofthe Bush
Task Group, the requirements of a rapidly
changing financial environment now justify
a modification ofthe present bank super-
visory and regulatory apparatus. This Letter
will discuss the Task Group's recommenda-
tions, and some previous proposals for
reorganization.
The current system
When the TaskGroupcommenced its inves-
tigations early last year, it noted that the
currentsystem ofFederal Regulation of
financial institutions and services is highly
complex and fragmented, the end-product
ofa series ofpiecemeal changes made in
response to specific problems or perceived
needs as they arose over the last 60 years.
Underthe present system, three separate
federal agencies regulate commercial banks
-the Officeofthe Comptrollerofthe Cur-
rency (in the Treasury Department), which
exercises primary supervisory and examina-
tion authority over some 4,600 national
banks, the FDIC, withprimaryauthorityover
some·8,900 state-chartered banks that are
not members ofthe Federal Reserve System
(plus some 330 mutual savings banks), and
the Federal Reserve, which exercises pri-
maryauthority over approximately 1,000
state-chartered member banks.
Underthe Bank HoldingCompany Act the
Fed also regulates all bank holdingcom-
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panies (about 5,000 in number), including
those whose banks are regulated by the'
Comptrollerand the FDIC. This includes
exclusive authority to define what activities
are so "closely related to ba'nking" oran
"appropriate incident thereto" as to be
permissiblefortheholdingcompanies' non-
bank subsidiaries. UnderCongressional
mandate, the Fed also exercises authority
over Edge Act and international banking
activities, and has rule-writing authority
for a host ofconsumer protection laws such
as Truth in Lending and Equal Credit
Opportunity.
Finally, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
and Credit Union National Association
exercise federal authority over the nation's
savings and loans and creditunions, respec-
tively, while each ofthe fifty states has its
own authorityforsupervising and regulating
state-chartered banks and thrifts.
Bush proposals
The Bush Task Group's recommendations
would, in its estimation, result in a substan-
tial modification ofthe current bank
regulatory system in a mannerthat would
"significantly benefit the public" by
reducing unnecessary overlap and duplica-
tion, waste and inefficiency. In conjunction
with pending legislative proposals, which
would permit a greater deregulation of
financial services, the Task Group also
believes that adoption of its recommenda-
tions also would encourage innovation and
competition in the provision offinancial
services.
The Federal Banking Agency
The main recommendation ofthe Task
Group is that a Federal Banking Agency
(FBA) be created to replace and assume the
responsibilities ofthe Comptroller within
the Treasury Department. It would super-
vise, examine and regulate all federally
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35 ofthe largest or "international class"
bank holdingcompanies whose lead bank is
a national bank, It also would assurne, from
the Board ofGovernors, authority to define
those non-bankingactivitiesthatare permis-
sible for a holding company's non-bank
subsidiaries,
For its part, the Fed would relinquish its
present rule writing authority but would still
be empoweredto cornmenton the proposed
"permissible activities" (and implementing
regulations) priorto their publication by the
FBA. And, by a vote offive ofthe seven
membersofthe Board ofGovernors, itcouId
veto the FBA's regu lations ifitdetermined
that their adoption would (1) impairthe sta-
bilityofthe U.S. banking system, or(2) have
a seriously adverse effecton safe and sound
financial practices.
The FDIC
The FDIC would be limited to activities
related to its deposit insurancefunction, and
would forego generalsupervisory authority
over state-chartered banks. However, it
would retain its authority to examine banks
for insurance purposes, keeping the author-
ity to deny or revoke insurance, and to set
premium levels in relation to the riskiness of
a bank's assets. In essence, this means that
its examination activities would focus on
troubled banks.
The Fed
The Fed would retain direct authority for
supervising, examiningand regulating some
50 so-called "international class" bank
holdingcompanies. These entities, which
includethe 35 whose lead bank is federally
chartered and 15 whose lead bank is state-
chartered, are defined by the Bush Task
Group as those which (1) own orcontrol
U.S. banks with foreign branches or
"material" foreign banking subsidiaries;
(2) have assets which aggregate more than
a halfpercentofthe assets ofall (domestic)
bankholdingcompanies; or(3) are aforeign
bank or a foreign holdingcompany which
owns orcontrols either a U.s. bank or
a foreign bank with branches, agencies or
banking subsidiaries in the United States.
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In addition, the Fed initially would continue
to regulate bank holdingcompanies whose
lead bank is state-chartered, and initially
would assume responsibility(from the FDIC)
forthe supervision, examination and regula-
tion ofapproximately 8,900 state-chartered
non,me!l1ber banks (which together with
state memberbanks hold 40 percent ofthe
total assets ofbanks in the U.s.).
"Certification" program
The word "initially" is significant because
the Task Group recommendations postulate
that "to the maximum degree practical and
prudent," the Fed, in conjunction with the
FBA and FDIC, is to establish a "certifica-
tion" program specifying the criteria and
standards under which state authorities
would assume the responsiblity for exer-
cising current federal examination and
supervision authority ove'r state chartered
banks andbank holdingcompanies.
The criteria and standards to be established
for "certifying" a state authority are to be
adopted by majority vote ofa committee
consisting ofthe FBA, the FRB, and the
FDIC. The Board ofGovernors, "in consul-
tation"-with the othertwo agencies, would
act on specific applications for certification
by a state authority, but the FDIC could veto
certification applications as well as the
Board's certification decisions, and also
could recommend the revocation ofcertifi-
cation decisions at any time. Subsequent to
the certification, the Board would exercise
oversight authority including, in the case of
state regulation ofbank holdingcompanies,
the rightto review and disapprove state
decisionswhich are considered tobe incon-
sistent with federal law orregulation. In the
event or to the extent that a state is not
certified, the Fed would exercise respon-
sibility for the federal supervision and
regulation ofthat state's banks andstate-
chartered holdingcompanies.
...and the thrifts
Finally, recognizing that in an era of rapidly
progressing deregulation and homogeniza-
tion offinancial services the differencesMONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1984
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker presented areport to the Congress on the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy objectives for 1984 on February 7. The report includes a
summary of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy plans along with a review of eco-
nomic and financial developments in 1983and the economic outlook in 1984. Single or
multiple copies ofthe report can be obtained upon request from the Public Information
Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA




Nevertheless, the denouement ofthe Task
Group's recommendations is uncertain, as
the reception they have received in the
Congress thus far has been less than over-
whelminglyenthusiastic.
Senate Banking Chairman Jake Garn (R-UT)
credits the proposals as a "heckofa good
starting point," butquestions the need for
the Fed to be directly involved in regulatory
matters in order to conduct monetary pol-
icy; he also argues that Congress should
decidewhat services institutions should be
allowed to offer "before we decide who
regulates." The Senate Banking Com-
mittee's ranking minority member, William
Proxmire (O-WI), has called the Task Group
proposals "an ill-disguised powergrab over
bank regulation bythe Reagan Administra-
tion." Others still ask "whatconsolida-
tion?", while yet others appear inclined
toward the traditional view, "ifit isn't
broken, don'tfix it."
Verle B. Johnston
Institutions Examination Council to solve
this problem. However, the Council
recently was criticized by the General
Accounting Office for not having achieved
its objectives ofbringing about greater
uniformity in examination and supervisory
procedures and reporting forms among its
member agencies.
Initial response
The Task Group's recommendations by all
counts will be drafted into legislative form
for submission to the Congress fairly soon,
and wiII have the endorsement ofthe Ad-
ministration. Chairman Volckerhas said that
the recommendations "adequately reflect
the concerns ofthe Federal Reserve" for
maintaining an effective presence in the
supervisory and regulatory process. This is
essential, he noted, tothe implementationof
the System's other responsibiIities, inas-
much as monetary policy and supervisory
and regulatory policies all affect bank
liquidity and the viability ofthe financial
structure.
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In summary, while none of the existing
federal banking agencies would be elim-
inated, adoption ofthe Task Group's
recommendations would result in a sub-
stantial reallocation ofthe three banking
agencies' present functions, including a
reduction from three totwo in the numberof
agencies involved in day-to-day supervision.
Past efforts at reform
Recent history is littered with the bones
ofnumerous proposals to revamp the super-
visory and regulatory structure. Consolida-
tion ofbank supervisory and regulatory
functions into the Fed was recommended in
1949 bythe HooverCommission and bythe
Commission on Moneyand Credit in 1961,
exceptthat the latter advocated a separate
agency to supervise all federal thrift insti-
tutions.ln 1962, President Kennedy's Advis-
ory Committee on Banking (the "Saxon
Committee") recommended thatthe Fed be
divested ofaI/ supervisory and regulatory
responsibilities except those pertaining to
monetary policy. In the same year, Gover-
nor Robertson proposed the establishment
ofasingle Federal Banking Commission to
handle all supervisory and regu latory
matters (on which the Fed would have one
member), thereby limitingthe Fed to the
conductofmonetary policy.
In 1974, Chairman Burns ofthe Board of
Governors called the bank supervisory
system "a jurisdictional tangle that boggles
the mind" but warned ofthe threat to inno-
vation and flexibility that would result from
the concentration ofpower in asingle
regulatory agency. The Financial Institutions
Regulation Act, enacted late in 1978, estab-
lished the inter-agency Federal Financial
between commercial banks and thrifts
rapidly is beingobliterated, the Task Group
recommends that the nation's savings and
loan associations continue to be subject to
supervision and regulation by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board only ifthey main-
tain a given proportion (not specified) of
their assets in the financing ofhousing.SS'lfl::> .LSijl:l
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Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore
OtherLiabilities for Borrowed MoneyS





Reserve' Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
Net free reserves (+llNet borrowed(-)
Weekended Weekended Comparable
year~ago period
1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes u.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowing via FRS, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
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